Safety First

PART I INTRODUCTION AND CONTEXT 13

1 Introduction 15
1.1 Providing Local Order and Safety: A Mayor’s Responsibility 15
1.2 A Changing Perspective on Public Safety 16
1.3 Securitization and the Power of Problem Definition 17
1.4 Research Questions and Scope 18
1.5 Relevance for Theory 20
1.6 Relevance for Practice 22
1.7 Structure of the Book 23

2 Local Safety Governance and the Dutch Mayor between 1990 and 2010 25
2.1 Local Safety Governance in the Netherlands 25
2.2 A Short History of Local Safety Governance in the Netherlands 26
2.2.1 Societal Changes Fueling the Need for Policy and Collaboration 26
2.2.2 The Entrance of Multiple New Providers of Local Safety 27
2.2.3 The Need for Policy Planning 28
2.2.4 Towards Local Safety Policies: A Series of Policy Plans 29
2.2.4.1 1984: The Roethof Committee 30
2.2.4.2 1985: Society and Crime 30
2.2.4.3 1993: Integral Safety Report 30
2.2.4.4 1994: Step-by-Step Plan for Integral Safety 31
2.2.4.5 1994: Integral Safety Report 31
2.2.4.6 1995: Pubic Safety Policy 1995-1998 31
2.2.4.7 1999: Integral Safety Program 31
2.2.4.8 2002: Towards a Safer Society 32
2.2.4.9 2007: Safety Starts with Prevention 32
2.2.5 The Integral Policy Ambition 33
2.2.6 Local Government’s Coordination of Local Safety Governance 35
2.3 Dutch Mayors and Local Safety 35
2.3.1 The Mayor’s Role in Local Governance 36
2.3.2 The Mayor’s Contemporary Playing Field 37
2.3.2.1 Trends in Local Society 37
2.3.2.2 Trends in Local Government 37
2.3.2.3 Trends Regarding the Mayor’s Function 38
2.3.3 The Mayor’s Formal Powers and Responsibilities for Local Order and Safety 39
2.3.4 The Public Debate: From Shepherd to Local Sheriff? 41
2.4 Summary 42

PART II THEORY 43

3 The Power of Problem Definition 45
3.1 Problem Definition 45
3.1.1 From Conditions to Problems 45
3.1.2 How Problem Definitions Structure Public Policy 46
3.2 Framing Theory 47
3.2.1 What Is a Frame? 48
3.2.2 Two Core Functions of Frames 49
3.2.3 Framing Public Problems: Discourses and Alignment 49
3.2.3.1 Discourse Coalitions 49
3.2.3.2 Frame Alignment 50
3.3 Securitization: Framing in Terms of Safety Problems 51
3.4 Summary 53

4 The Position and Role of State Actors in Policy Networks 55
4.1 A Short History of the Concept of Governance 55
4.1.1 The Shift from Government to Governance 55
4.1.2 State Actors in Networked Governance 56
4.1.3 A Call for Local Leadership 57
4.2 Tackling Public Problems in Policy Networks 58
4.2.1 Networks as a Response to Complexity 58
4.2.2 Policy Networks: A Framework for Action 59
4.2.3 Context Matters: Supra-Local Institutional Arrangements 60
4.3 Conceptualizing Roles and Positions in Networked Governance 60
4.3.1 Social Structure, Position and Role 61
4.4 Summary 62

PART III RESEARCH DESIGN 65

5 Conceptual Model 67
5.1 Towards a Conceptual Model 67
5.1.1 Phase A: Framing Safety Problems in Local Policy Networks 67
5.1.2 Phase B: The Institutionalization of Shared Problem Frames into Public Policy 68
5.1.3 Phase C: Enactment by Mayor and Partners during the Process of Policy Implementation 69
5.1.4 Including the Supra-Local Policy Context 69
5.1.5 A Flexible Model 70
5.2 Operationalization 72
5.3 Summary 72

6 Research Design 77
6.1 A Twofold Research Design 77
6.2 Macro Study Design 78
6.2.1 Research Strategy: Desk Research 78
6.2.2 Data Collection and Analysis 79
6.3 Case Study Design 80
6.3.1 Case Selection 81
6.3.1.1 Selection of Sub Cases 81
6.3.1.2 Selection of Cases 81
6.3.2 Data Collection and Analysis 83
6.3.3 Generalization of Case Study Findings 85
6.4 Summary 85

PART IV RESEARCH FINDINGS 87

7 Macro Study 89
7.1 Defining Local Safety Problems between 1990 and 2010 89
7.1.1 Issue Presence 89
7.1.2 Issue Expansion 89
7.1.3 Issue Dominance 92
7.2 Summary 93

8 Case Study Haarlem 97
8.1 Introduction 97
8.2 Sub Case 1: Drug-Related Nuisance in Haarlem 99
8.2.1 Coffee Shops Causing Trouble in the Early 1990s 100
8.2.1.1 Initial Framing Process 101
8.2.1.2 The Mayor’s Role on Paper and in Practice 104
8.2.1.3 Institutional Arrangements 104
8.2.2 New Powers for the Mayor to Tackle Hard Drugs in the Late 1990s 105
8.2.2.1 Frame Expansion Process 105
8.2.2.2 The Mayor’s Role on Paper and in Practice 107
8.2.2.3 Institutional Arrangements 108
8.2.3 Towards a Regime of Tight Control and Sanctions: The Late 2000s 109
8.2.3.1 Frame Hardening Process 109
8.2.3.2 The Mayors Role on Paper and in Practice 112
8.2.3.3 Institutional Arrangements 113
8.3 Sub Case 2: Domestic Violence in Haarlem 114
8.3.1 Safety-Related Perspectives on Domestic Violence in the Late 1990s 116
8.3.1.1 Initial Framing Process 116
8.3.1.2 The Mayor’s Role on Paper and in Practice 119
8.3.1.3 Institutional Arrangements 120
8.3.2 The Regional Approach of the Late 2000s 121
8.3.2.1 Frame Expansion 122
8.3.2.2 The Mayor’s Role on Paper and in Practice 125
8.3.2.3 Institutional Arrangements 126
8.4 Sub Case 3: Organized Crime in Haarlem 127
8.4.1 Preventing Unintended Governmental Support for Illegal Activities Mid-2000s 128
8.4.1.1 Initial Framing Process 129
8.4.1.2 The Mayor’s Role on Paper and in Practice 132
8.4.1.3 Institutional Arrangements 133
8.4.2 A Regional Approach to Various Forms of Organized Crime during the Late 2000s 134
8.4.2.1 Frame Expansion 134
8.4.2.2 The Mayor’s Role on Paper and in Practice 137
8.4.2.3 Institutional Arrangements 138
8.5 Preliminary Conclusions: Case Haarlem 139
8.5.1 Preliminary Answer to Sub-Question 4 139
8.5.2 Preliminary Answer to Sub-Question 5 141

9 Case Study Breda 143
9.1 Introduction 143
9.2 Sub Case 4: Drug-Related Nuisance in Breda 145
9.2.1 Coffee Shops Causing Trouble Early 1990s 147
9.2.1.1 Initial Local Framing Process 147
9.2.1.2 The Mayor’s Role on Paper and in Practice 150
9.2.1.3 Institutional Arrangements 151
9.2.2 Soft, Hard and New Drugs in the Region in the Late 1990s 151
9.2.2.1 Frame Expansion 152
9.2.2.2 The Mayor’s Role on Paper and in Practice 154
9.2.2.3 Institutional Arrangements 154
9.2.3 Revision of the Local Drugs Policy in the Late 2000s 155
9.2.3.1 Frame Expansion Process 155
9.2.3.2 The Mayor’s Role on Paper and in Practice 157
9.2.3.3 Institutional Arrangements 158
9.3 Sub Case 5: Domestic Violence in Breda 159
9.3.1 Initial Local Framing Process of Domestic Violence as a Policy Problem in the Early 2000s 160
9.3.1.1 Initial Framing Process 161
9.3.1.2 The Mayor’s Role on Paper and in Practice 165
9.3.1.3 Institutional Arrangements in the Early 2000s 166
9.3.2 Mayors and Home Restrictions in the Late 2000s 167
9.3.2.1 Frame Expansion 167
9.3.2.2 The Mayor’s Role on Paper and in Practice 169
9.3.2.3 Institutional Arrangements 171
9.4 Sub Case 6: Organized Crime in Breda 172
9.4.1 Local Government Adopts the First Administrative Tools on Organized Crime in the Early 2000s 173
9.4.1.1 Initial Local Framing Process 174
9.4.1.2 The Mayor’s Role on Paper and in Practice 176
9.4.1.3 Institutional Arrangements in the Early 2000s 176
9.4.2 Task Force for Organized Crime in the Late 2000s 177
9.4.2.1 Frame Expansion 177
9.4.2.2 The Mayor’s Role on Paper and in Practice 182
9.4.2.3 Institutional Arrangements in the Late 2000s 183
9.5 Preliminary Conclusions Case Breda 184
9.5.1 Preliminary Answer to Sub-Question 4 184
9.5.2 Preliminary Answer to Sub-Question 5 186

PARTV ANALYSIS 189

10 Cross Case Comparison 191
10.1 How New Safety Problems Were Framed in Local Policy Networks 191
10.1.1 Drug-Related Nuisance, Domestic Violence and Organized Crime Have Been Securitized Successfully 191
10.1.2 Discourse Coalitions with a Higher Level of Formal Agenda Setting and Decision-Making Power Were Most Successful 193
10.1.3 Framing Local Safety Problems Was Never a Purely Local Endeavor 194
10.2 How New Definitions Affected the Mayor’s Role on Paper and in Practice 194
10.2.1 Drug-Related Nuisance 194
10.2.2 Domestic Violence 196
10.2.3 Organized Crime 197
10.2.4 Overall Findings 198
10.2.4.1 Expansion of the Mayor’s Expected Role ‘on Paper’ by Local Adoption of New Powers 198
10.2.4.2 Mayors Got Involved with Addressing New Safety Issues through Administrative and Operational Activities 199
10.2.4.3 The Mayor’s ‘Playing Field’ Expanded with New Partners from Local Regional, National and International Policy Arenas 199
10.2.4.4 Expansion of the Mayor’s Expected Role Did Not Automatically Lead to Alteration of His Actions in Practice 199
10.3 How Institutional Arrangements Affected Local Policy Processes 200
10.3.1 Local Arena 200
10.3.2 Regional Arena 203
10.3.3 National Arena 204
10.3.4 International Arena 204
10.3.5 Mixture of Institutional Arrangements 205
10.4 Implications for the Conceptual Model 205
10.4.1 Securitization of Local Issues Does Indeed Affect the Mayor’s Position and Role 205
10.4.2 Three Mechanisms of Policy- and Role Structuration 206
10.4.3 Local Debate is a Sufficient Condition for Discourse Institutionalization 207
10.4.4 Personal Alignment is a Vital Condition for Frame Enactment 207
10.4.5 Time Affects the Local Framing Process in Multiple Ways 208

PART VI CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 211

11 Conclusion 213
11.1 Answers to Sub-Questions 213
11.2 Answer to the Central Question 219
11.3 Theoretical Implications 220
11.3.1 Implications of the Macro Study 220
11.3.2 Implications of Case Studies 221
11.3.2.1 Agenda Setting Literature 221
11.3.2.2 Framing Literature 223
11.3.2.3 State Actors in Networked Safety Governance 224
11.4 Implications for Practice 224
11.4.1 Mayors: Not Sheriffs but Powerful and Dependent Actors 224
11.4.2 ‘Super Networker’ Most Suitable Leadership Style 225
11.4.3 (De)Securitization is a Powerful Tool for Local Governance 226
11.4.4 Using National Powers in Local Societies 227

References 229

Appendix A: List of Documents Macro Study 239
Appendix B: List of Respondents and Documents Case Studies 243