On the European Court of Human Rights

1 Prologue 1

Part I General – Legal Philosophy
2 The European Convention on Human Rights in Statu Nascendi 5
2.1 The American Undertaking 5
2.2 The Interdependence of Democracy and the Rule of Law 6
2.3 The Spirit of the Convention 6
2.4 The Purposes of the Founding Fathers of the Convention and Court 7
2.5 The Arrival of the New Central and East European Judges 7
2.6 The Constitutional Court of Europe? 8
2.7 The Moral High Ground of the West European States 9
2.8 The Rise of International Case Law 10
2.9 The Quality of the ECtHR Case Law 11
2.10 The Forty-Seven Pyramids? 13
2.11 The Binding Nature of the Judgments of the ECtHR 14
2.11.1 The de Facto Binding Nature of the ECtHR’s Judgments 15
2.11.2 The Binding Nature of the Judgments of the ECtHR 15
2.11.3 The Pilot Judgments 16
2.11.4 The Binding Nature of Judgments in Domestic Law: De Facto, de Iure and as a Source of Law 18
2.12 The Residual Values 18
2.12.1 The Socio-Psychological Remark 19

3 In the Context of Common Law 21
3.1 Introduction 21
3.2 Common Lawand the Continental Legal Tradition: Judge-Made vs. the Law Developing from the Legislature 23
3.2.1 First, Common Law Is a Judge-Made Law 23
3.2.2 Second, Like Cases Should Be Decided Alike (Stare Decisis): Once Published, the Judgments Became Binding Precedents 23
3.2.2.1 Introduction 24
3.2.2.2 Common Law 25
3.2.2.3 The Self-Referential Danger 27
3.2.2.4 Continental Legal System 29
3.2.2.5 Antinomy of Facts and Law 30
3.2.2.6 Codification 35
3.2.2.7 Conclusion 38
3.2.3 Third, the Calculability (Foreseeability) of the Law 39
3.2.4 Fourth, ex Ante and ex Post Formation of the Law 40
3.2.5 Fifth, Do the Judges Discover or Do They Create the Law? 41
3.2.6 Sixth, the Incremental vs. the Instant Creation (Discovery) of the Law 42
3.3 The European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg 44
3.3.1 The Convention 44
3.3.2 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 44
3.3.3 ECtHR and Common Law 45
3.3.4 The Exceptional Condition of Continental Law 46
3.4 Conclusion 48

4 On the Sense of Justice: ΣΠΟΥΔΑῖΟΣ vs. Legal Formalists 49
4.1 Introduction 49
4.2 Autonomous Legal Reasoning: The Preliminary Question 49
4.3 Legal Expert Systems 50
4.4 Single Judge ‘Formation’ Procedure 52
4.5 Back to Legal Reasoning 53
4.6 Piaget-Kohlberg 53
4.7 Attitude towards Authority 55
4.8 Dissenting Opinion 57
4.9 Ambivalence and Ambiguity 63
4.10 Spoudaios (σπουδαῖος) 65
4.11 Zhenren 68
4.12 Back to Reality 70

5 The Rule of Law, Rechtsstaat, Etat de Droit 71
5.1 Rechtsstaat 71
5.2 L’Etat de Droit 72
5.3 Judicial Review of Constitutionality: Marbury v. Madison and the American Rule of Law 72
5.4 The Power of Logic vs. the Logic of Power 73
5.4.1 The Logic of Power Necessitates the Judicial Power of Logic (and Vice Versa) 74
5.5 The Persuasive Power of Legal Reasoning 75
5.6 Magna Carta Libertatum (1215) 75
5.7 The Binding Power of International Jurisdictions 76
5.8 The Independence of the Judicial Branch 77

6 Of Rights and of Privileges: The Morality of Duty vs. the Morality of Aspiration 79
6.1 Introduction 79
6.2 The Right and the Remedy 82
6.3 The Procedural Context 83
6.3.1 The Example of Roman Law 85
6.4 Modern Law 86
6.5 The Right and the Legality 86
6.5.1 The Principle of Legality in Criminal Law 87
6.6 The Privilege 88
6.7 The Two ECtHR Cases 89
6.7.1 E.B. v. France: The Introduction of the Idea 89
6.7.2 Boulois v. Luxembourg: The Precedential Follow-up 92
6.8 Academia 93
6.9 The Middle Ground 94
6.10 Majhen v. Slovenia 95
6.11 Conclusion 97

Part II Reasoning
7 Two Different Modes of Legal Reasoning 101
7.1 The Abstract and the Concrete 101
7.2 Legal Definitions 102
7.3 Power and the Reification of Legal Concepts 103
7.4 The Conflict Resolution Role of the Law 103
7.5 Heteronomous Legal Reasoning 104
7.5.1 Formal and Substantive Justice 105
7.5.2 Authoritarian and Anti-Authoritarian Attitudes of the Judges 106
7.5.3 Authoritarian Legal Formalism 107
7.5.4 Excessive Definitions 109
7.6 Common Law: The Similarities between Different Cases 110
7.6.1 Hobbes 112
7.7 The Instrumental Nature of Truth Finding 113
7.8 Legal Formalism and the Resolution of Conflicts 114
7.8.1 Closed-Textured vs. Open-Textured 114
7.8.2 Roman Law 116
7.8.2.1 Lex Rhodia de Iactu 116
7.8.2.2 Justinian and His Codex Iustinianus 117
7.9 The Difficult Verge of Practising at Common Law 118
7.9.1 The Absence of Strategic Simplification 118
7.10 Norms and Facts in the Two Legal Systems 118
7.10.1 Legal Process 119
7.10.2 Leibniz and His ‘Monads’ 119
7.10.3 The Chicken and the Egg 120
7.10.4 Qualification Juridique (Legal Qualification) 121
7.10.4.1 Dostoyevsky 121
7.10.5 What Are the ‘Facts’? 122
7.10.6 Perception and Apperception 123
7.11 ECTHR and the Constitutional Courts in Europe 124

8 The Syllogistic vs. the Analogical Mode of Reasoning 127
8.1 Empirical Demonstration: Hic Rhodus, Hic Salta! 128
8.2 Case Study: Burden v. the United Kingdom (2008) 128
8.3 My Dissenting Opinion 129

9 The Logical Compulsion 137
9.1 Logical Compulsion and the Reasoning by Analogy 137
9.1.1 Argumentum a Minori ad Maius 138
9.1.2 Argumentum ad Absurdum 138
9.1.3 The ‘Slippery Slope’ Argument and Purposive Legal Reasoning (Teleological Method) 138

Part III Remedies and Principles
10 Primary and Secondary Rules: Reversal in the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights 143
10.1 Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention 144
10.1.1 Article 8 144
10.1.2 The Proportionality Test 144
10.1.3 Article 9 145
10.1.4 Article 10 147
10.1.5 Article 11 148
10.2 Theoretical Discussion 149
10.2.1 Pinto Coelho v. Portugal (2016) 150
10.2.2 Medipress-Sociedade Jornalística, LDA v. Portugal (2016) 151
10.3 Conclusion 152

11 The Rights and the Remedies in Their Procedural Context 153
11.1 Human Rights in Their ‘Essence’ 157
11.2 ‘Living Instrument’: The European Convention as a Silent Revolution in Continental Law 160
11.2.1 The Abstract and the Concrete 160
11.2.2 Interpretation 161
11.3 The Binding Nature of Judicial Decisions 162
11.4 How Many Cases? 164
11.5 Human Rights as an Epiphenomenon 164
11.6 Explicating the Hypothesis: A Few Intermediate Conclusions 165
11.7 The Epistemological Meta-Analysis 166

12 The Procedural Remedies 169
12.1 The Partly Concurring Opinion in Lucà v. Italy (2001) 169
12.1.1 Part II 169
12.1.2 Part III 172
12.2 The Revolutionary Change in the ECTHR Remedies 173
12.2.1 Lucà v. Italy (Separate Opinion – Part I) 173
12.2.1.1 Partly Concurring Opinion – Part I 173
12.2.2 The Substantive Remedy: Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy 176
12.2.2.1 Douglas, Zidar, Chayes and Bultrini 176
12.2.3 The Scozzari Follow-up Cases 177

13 Causation 179
13.1 Introduction 179
13.2 Statistical Evidence and Class Action 180
13.3 Blameworthiness and Imputation 182
13.4 Is Objective Reality Accessible? 183
13.5 Fetishisation of Science 184
13.6 The Search for Truth: Inquisitorial and Adversary 184
13.7 Thomas Aquinas: Adequatio Intellectus et Rei 185
13.8 Shared Responsibility 186
13.9 The Jury 187
13.10 Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy and the Problem of Abstract Causation 187
13.11 Mastromatteo v. Italy 189

14 Ne Bis in Idem (Double Jeopardy) 191
14.1 Introduction 191
14.2 Concurrence of Offences, Ideal and Real 191
14.3 The Logical Impasse 192
14.3.1 The Dialectics of Norms and Facts 192
14.4 The Facts 193
14.4.1 Pirandello 194
14.5 The Distinctiveness of the Historical Event 195
14.6 Common Law and Double Jeopardy 195
14.7 The Case of Zdenek Sovák 195
14.8 The Relevant US Cases 196
14.9 Different Legal Incriminations 199
14.10 The Lon Fuller Doctrine 200
14.11 The Burden of Proof (Onus Probandi) 201
14.12 Conclusion 201

15 Impartiality of Decision-Making and the Partiality of the Decision 203
15.1 What is Impartiality? 203
15.2 Hasty Decision Making: The Case of Ališić et al. v. Slovenia and Serbia 204
15.3 Kyprianou v. Cyprus 212

16 Impartiality in Criminal Procedure – An Epistemological Excursus Informing the Jalloh v. Germany and Gäfgen v. Germany Cases at the European Court of Human Rights 219
16.1 Introduction 219
16.2 Formation of Hypothesis (Accusation) 219
16.3 Investigation 221
16.4 Impartiality 222
16.5 Systemic Procrustean Tendency 225
16.6 Presumption of Innocence v. Presumption of Guilt 225
16.7 The Pursuit of ‘Truth’ 227
16.8 The Ideal Type of Adversary Procedure 229
16.9 The Inquisitorial Model 230
16.10 Conclusion 231

Part III Human Rights
17 What Are Human Rights? 235
17.1 Universality of Human Rights? 235
17.1.1 Historical Impediment in the Rise of the Nation State 235
17.2 Universality of Human Rights 236
17.3 Universality: Substantive or Procedural? 236
17.3.1 In Roman Law 236
17.3.2 Professor Franck’s ‘Universality’ 237
17.3.2.1 The Clash of Civilisations 237
17.3.3 Cultural Discrepancies and the Binding Power of the ECtHR and Constitutional Courts 238
17.4 Human Rights as an Epiphenomenon 240
17.4.1 The Individual vs. the State 240

18 Right to Privacy and Personality Rights vs. Freedom of Expression 243
18.1 Introduction 243
18.2 Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 243
18.2.1 Olmstead v. the United States 243
18.2.2 Halford v. the UK 244
18.3 Personality Rights and Human Rights 245
18.4 Roman Law 246

19 The Trend 251
19.1 The Two ‘Lucky Strike’ Cases 251
19.2 The Immune System of the Body Politic 255
19.3 The ECTHR Tends to Ignore Paragraph 2 of Article 10 257
19.4 The Case Furst-Pfeifer v. Austria 258

20 The Right to Life and the Legal Subjectivity of the Nasciturus 263
20.1 Introduction 263
20.2 History of Abortion 264
20.2.1 Ancient Sources 264
20.2.1.1 Code of Hammurabi (1772–1771 BC) 264
20.2.1.2 The Assyrians’ Code of the Assura (cca. 1075 BC) 265
20.2.1.3 Pentateuch According to Talmud (Old Testament) 265
20.2.2 The Greeks 266
20.2.2.1 The Oath of Hippocrates (460–357 BC) 266
20.2.2.2 Plato (428–347 BC) and Aristotle (384–322 BC) 266
20.2.3 Roman Law: Nasciturus as Legal Subject 266
20.2.4 Medieval Law 268
20.2.4.1 Gratianus (1140) 268
20.3 Cutting-Edge Development 268
20.3.1 Legal Subjectivity of Animals 268
20.4 Modern Domestic Legal Sources 269
20.4.1 The US Supreme Court Federal Case of Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113, at 114-115 (1973) 269
20.4.2 The Position of the German Constitutional Court (1975) 270
20.5 International Law 271
20.5.1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 271
20.5.2 The American Declaration on Human Rights (1969) 271
20.5.3 European Declaration on Human Rights (1953) 271
20.5.4 International Covenant on Human and Political Rights (1966) 272
20.5.5 The Case of Vo v. France (2005): Petitio Principii (Begging the Question) 272
20.5.5.1 The Facts 272
20.5.5.2 The Issue 273
20.5.5.3 The Holding 274
20.5.5.4 The Dissenting Opinion of Judge Georg Ress 274
20.5.6 Lambert v. France (2015) and the Legal Subjectivity of a Non-Living Human Being 275
20.5.6.1 Legal Subjectivity of an Embryo or Foetus 277
20.5.7 The Convention and the Court 278
20.5.7.1 Interpretations: The European Regional Level: The ECtHR on the Rights of the Child 278
20.5.7.2 In Summary 279
20.5.8 Recent Developments at the UN International Level: Argumentum ad Absurdum 280
20.5.8.1 The Overview of the Legal Status Quo 280
20.5.8.2 The United NationsInternationalCovenant onCivil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 281
20.6 Conclusion 283

21 The Discrepancy between What the Court Says and What the Real Rationes Decidendi Were 287
21.1 Intuition in General 287
21.2 Legal Intuition 289
21.3 Sense of Justice 290
21.4 Bishop Berkeley: Legal Reasoning ex Ante and Justification ex Post 292
21.4.1 Arriving at a Decision 293
21.5 The Example of the Privilege against Self-Incrimination 295
21.6 The Role of Legal Theory 296
21.7 The Relevant Problem at the ECTHR: The Slippery Slope 297
Epilogue

22 Epilogue: The Collapse of Normative Integration 301
22.1 Assimilated Norms and Societal Functioning 301
22.2 Sociologically 302
22.3 Individually 302
22.3.1 Oedipalization 302
22.3.2 Boys 302
22.3.3 Girls 303
22.3.4 Carole Pateman 303
22.3.5 The Universality of the Oedipal Triangle 304
22.3.6 Endocrinological Aspect 305
22.4 Endocrine Disruptors 305
22.4.1 De-Masculinisation of the Brain 306
22.4.2 How Does De-Masculinization Affect Normative Integration? 307
22.4.3 Observable Feminisation of Men 307
22.4.4 Fatal Effect upon the Identification with the Father 308
22.4.5 Adoption of Rudimentary Distinction between Right and Wrong 309
22.4.6 What Kind of Morality Will the Boy Adopt? 309
22.5 The Epidemic of Sexual Non-Differentiation 310
22.5.1 Generational Accumulation of Degenerations 311
22.5.2 Collective Denial and Political Correctness 311
22.5.3 Father and Son 311
22.6 Lacan’s ‘Law’ Is Now Coming from Women 312
22.6.1 Subversion 313
22.6.2 Impostors 313
22.6.3 Anomie 314
22.6.4 Feminism 315
22.6.5 Bruno Bettelheim and the ‘Acting-Out of the Oedipal Conflict‘ 316
22.7 Tentative Conclusion 317
22.8 Prognosis 317

Index 319
Case Law 325