State-Building, Lawmaking, and Criminal Justice in Afghanistan

Accepted Terms and Abbreviations XIII

1 The research 1
1.1 Introduction 1
1.1.1 State-building 2
1.1.2 Lawmaking 4
1.1.3 Criminal justice 8
1.1.4 The institution-building explanatory framework 9
1.2 Rationale – Pul-e-charkhi and rehabilitation 10
1.3 Research questions and working definitions 15
1.4 Research methodology and limitations 17
1.5 The prisons 21
1.5.1 Pul-e-charkhi prison 22
1.5.2 Balkh prison 24
1.6 Dissertation structure 26

2 State-building, lawmaking, and criminal justice before and after the 2001 international intervention 27
2.1 Introduction 27
2.2 A periodisation of the pre-2001 era, political rupture, and subsequent regimes 27
2.3 Fights for identity, self-defence, and statehood (the revolving door of history) 29
2.4 Fights between traditionalism and modernity 37
2.5 The golden era 41
2.6 The one-party republic 44
2.7 Socialist legality and the onset of civil war 46
2.8 The era of civil wars 48
2.9 Post-2001 international intervention 52
2.10 Conclusion 58

3 The institutional context for post-2001 lawmaking and criminal justice reform 61
3.1 Introduction 61
3.2 The Bonn Process: towards reform and rebuilding (2001-2005) 63
3.2.1 The new Constitution: problems and dilemmas with the drafting and reviewing phases 63
3.2.2 The Constitutional Loya Jirga: problems and dilemmas in the adoption phase 70
3.2.3 Substantive problems throughout 71
3.2.4 Temporary and permanent institutions 72
3.2.5 The Judicial Reform Commission 75
3.2.6 Donor-led reform leads to disruption 78
3.3 The Post-Bonn Process: towards Afghan-ownership (2006 and beyond) 79
3.3.1 London conference 2006: the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan National Development Strategy 79
3.3.2 Rome conference 2007: The National Justice Sector Strategy and the National Justice Sector Programme 81
3.3.3 Kabul conference 2010: the National Priority Programs 82
3.3.4 Tokyo conference 2012: the Mutual Accountability Framework 83
3.3.5 Tokyo conference 2014: Preparing for transformation (2015-2024) 84
3.3.6 A critical discussion regarding reform intervention 84
3.3.6.1 Afghan National Development Strategy’s secretariat 86
3.3.6.2 Dedicated project management units 86
3.3.6.3 Working groups as institutions of reform 88
3.3.6.4 Benchmarking as an institution of reform 89
3.4 A story of conflicting contributions (the Bagram detention center) 90
3.5 Conclusion 93

4 A case study of criminal justice laws reformed due to the post-2001 overhaul 97
4.1 Introduction 97
4.2 The standard lawmaking process post-2001 97
4.3 The practice of lawmaking post-2001 103
4.3.1 The criminal procedure codes (2004 and 2014) 104
4.3.2 The Interim Criminal Procedure Code 2004 106
4.3.3 The Criminal Procedure Code 2014 109
4.3.4 The Penal Code (1976 and 2017) 116
4.3.5 The Prisons and Detention Centres Law (2005, 2007, and 2020) 119
4.4 Conclusion 124

5 The legal mandate for prisons and the challenge of rehabilitation 127
5.1 Introduction 127
5.2 The concept of rehabilitation 127
5.3 The policy and legal basis for the prison system mandate 131
5.4 The prison system’s legal and policy foundations 131
5.4.1 Substantive issues within the prison system’s legal framework 133
5.4.2 Operational issues within the prison system’s legal framework 135
5.5 Mandate emerging from the body of laws 137
5.5.1 Rehabilitation as an important legal mandate 137
5.6 Domestic actors’ perceptions of rehabilitation 140
5.7 Conclusion 143

6 Pul-e-charkhi: the context 145
6.1 Introduction 145
6.2 The historical context of Pul-e-charkhi 145
6.2.1 The birth of Pul-e-charkhi (the prison project) 146
6.2.2 Pul-e-charkhi under the People’s Democratic Party (1978-1991) 149
6.2.3 Pul-e-charkhi under the Mujahidin (1991-1996) 152
6.2.4 Pul-e-charkhi under the Taliban (1996 to 2001) 156
6.3 The political context – post-2001 157
6.3.1 Controversial international investments and the prison system 158
6.3.2 Controversial state policies and the prison system 159
6.3.3 Issues of institutional independence and the prison system 161
6.4 The socio-economic context 162
6.5 Technologies 166
6.6 Some comparative observations regarding Balkh prison 168
6.7 Conclusion 168

7 Pul-e-charkhi – the institution 171
7.1 Introduction 171
7.2 Major institutional changes in the prison system since 2001 172
7.2.1 The evolution of militarised prison management 172
7.2.2 Partial demilitarisation, substantive reform, and new problems 173
7.2.3 Reinstating a ‘security first’ approach to prison management 177
7.3 The prison systems’ internal structure 179
7.3.1 Internal structure – national Prison Administration 179
7.3.2 Internal structure – Pul-e-charkhi 181
7.3.2.1 Management meetings 182
7.3.2.2 The Baashees 183
7.3.3 Rehabilitation programmes 184
7.4 The leadership 185
7.4.1 General prison management and leadership 185
7.4.2 Management and leadership of individual programmes 187
7.5 Resources 188
7.5.1 Financial resources 189
7.5.2 Human resources 191
7.5.3 Infrastructure 193
7.6 Some comparative observations regarding Balkh prison 195
7.6.1 Leadership 195
7.6.2 Infrastructure and resources 196
7.7 Conclusion 197

8 Pul-e-charkhi: the prisoners and the failing rehabilitation programmes 201
8.1 Introduction 201
8.2 Prisoner categories and living conditions 201
8.3 The intake process, daily life, and interests of prisoners 205
8.4 Rehabilitation programmes in Pul-e-charkhi 211
8.4.1 Prison-based education and literacy programmes 211
8.4.2 The official school programme 212
8.4.3 The adult literacy programme 214
8.4.4 Madrasa as prison-based education 214
8.4.5 Assessment of target group factors for the education programmes 215
8.4.6 The prison-based work and vocational training programme 217
8.4.7 Assessment of target group factors for the work and vocational training programmes 221
8.5 Prisoners’ coping mechanisms 222
8.5.1 Andiwali as a coping mechanism 223
8.5.2 Corruption and prison system faults as coping mechanisms 223
8.6 A comparative observation from Balkh prison 225
8.7 Conclusion 226

9 Main conclusions 229
9.1 Introduction 229
9.2 Evolution of the prison system’s legal mandate 231
9.3 Implementation of the prison system’s legal mandate 233
9.4 State-building efforts and their impact on lawmaking and criminal justice 235
9.4.1 State-building 235
9.4.2 Lawmaking 238
9.4.3 The criminal Justice system 240
9.5 Pul-e-charkhi 242
9.6 Lessons from Balkh prison 244

10 Epilogue – post-2020 changes, the Taliban takeover, and changes in the prison system 245
10.1 Introduction 245
10.2 The Office of Prison Administration and its challenges 245
10.3 History repeats itself: prison reform follows politics 249
10.4 Prison administration and its operation under the Taliban 251

Bibliography 255
About the Author 273